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Non-state threats and actors have become key factors in contemporary security. However, little 
research has been conducted on the relationship between the two. The aim of this book is to 
address this gap by examining the growing role of non-state actors - both as the cause of new 
security threats, such as civil war, transnational crime, terrorism, infectious diseases, and the 
proliferation of small arms, and as security providers, including non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), private security companies, and international regimes. 
Since the end of the Cold War the notion that the state is the primary unit of interest in 
security studies has increasingly been challenged. Statistics show that today many more people 
are killed by ethnic conflicts, HIV/AIDS, or the proliferation of small arms than by interstate 
wars. Moreover, non-state actors are progressively complementing states in the provision of 
security. This chapter suggests that both developments can be understood as part of a shift 
from “government” to “governance” in security. This shift is characterized by the changing 
nature of threats in contemporary world politics and the ways in which they are addressed. In 
particular, the following seeks to illustrate the emergence of a system of security governance in 
which the making and implementation of security policies is shared among overlapping 
networks of state and non-state actors at the national, regional, and global levels. 
The concept of security governance can thus serve as an overarching theoretical 
framework for the contributions to this volume that brings together experts on new threats 
and new actors. It seeks to examine how private actors have become one of the main sources of 
insecurity in the contemporary world, but also how non-state actors play a growing role in 
combating these threats.  
 
 
New Threats and New Actors 
 
Many will assert that neither civil war, transnational crime, infectious diseases, or the 
proliferation of small arms are new phenomena, nor is the involvement of  
 [4] non-state actors, such as NGOs and private firms, in security policy. Before one can turn to 
an analysis of the transformation of security since the end of the Cold War, it is therefore 
necessary to examine why this volume talks about “new” threats and “new” actors. 
 
Changing Threat Environment 
To understand the changing nature of threat in contemporary global security one needs to 
define what is understood as security threat. A general reading of the term suggests that a 
security threat can be defined as an event with potentially negative consequences for the 
survival or welfare of a state, a society, or an individual. However, already this simple attempt 
at defining a security threat indicates the complexity of the concept. First, this definition 
suggests that a security threat refers to a possible future event. Our assessment that something 
represents a threat thus depends very much on the probability attributed to an event. Some 
negative events might be considered to be so unlikely that they are not considered a security 
threat anymore, such as a civil war in the United States or a military conflict between the 
member states of the European Union. Second, a security threat is characterized by the 
intensity of its potential effects, i.e. whether it endangers the survival or merely the welfare of 
human beings. Some threats, such as infectious diseases and weapons of mass destruction 
affect the welfare and survival of humans in a very immediate manner. Others, such as threats 
to the environment or the livelihood of peoples, affect the survival of humans in a more indirect 
way. Third, a security threat is defined by the geographical scope of its effects. Nuclear war, for 
instance, not only poses a danger to entire regions, but to life on earth in general. Conversely, 
the effects of civil wars are commonly limited to states or sub-regions. Finally, the nature of a 
security threat can be classified by its object. Threats are be differentiated according to 
whether they are directed at a collective, such as a state, an ethnicity or a religious group, or at 
individuals. 
The preceding analysis illustrates that a security threat is as much a subjective as an 
objective category. Some aspects of it, such as the intensity and scope of a particular threat, can 
be assessed on the basis of technical data and evidence. The reach of a ballistic missile, for 
instance, can be measured. Others, such as an assessment of the probability of an ethnic conflict 
or the use of weapons of mass destruction in a border conflict, are inherently subjective and 
based on an understanding of the individuals involved in taking these decisions. 
As a consequence of the complexity and subjectivity of threat assessment, our 
understanding of what presents a security threat in the 21st century has changed considerably. 
In particular, the end of the Cold War has led to a fundamental reassessment of key security 
threats. The following section examines some of the primary security concerns today. 
 
Contemporary Security Threats 
During the Cold War the primary national and international security threat indisputably was 
nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union. With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 
1990 and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, this threat has suddenly disappeared. However,  
 [5] rather than leading to a period of unprecedented security, it has been replaced in the 
minds of decision-makers and the general public by a multitude of new security threats, 
such as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, civil war, and ethnic 
conflict.  
What makes these the primary security threats of the new century? The above section 
has argued that what is a key security threat is inevitably based on subjective assessments. 
Thus, the end of the Cold War did not lead to the elimination of nuclear war between the major 
powers as the first and foremost security threat because of the dismantling of all their nuclear 
weapons. In fact in 2003, both the United States and Russia still retained between seven and 
eight thousand nuclear warheads.1 The threat of a global nuclear exchange has primarily 
decreased because of trust in the changed foreign policy imperatives of these two countries. 
Similarly, the degree to which new security threats such as terrorism are considered of prime 
importance today is not only dependent upon the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
which might be used in a terrorist attack, but also on subjective estimates of the probability of 
such action, likely targets, scope, and intensity. 
The range of factors involved in defining a security threat make the ranking of threats a 
difficult and very political choice. Since the resources of governments and international 
organizations are limited, they have to decide whether to make a threat with limited scope and 
intensity, but high probability, a priority or a threat with global reach and deadly 
consequences, but a comparatively low likelihood. 
Among the new security threats identified by contemporary governments, terrorism is 
the most limited in terms of intensity, i.e. the number of peoples directly affected by death or 
injury. Empirical data on the degree of threat posed by terrorism shows that terrorism causes 
relatively few deaths if compared to other security concerns such as interstate war, civil 
conflict, or infectious diseases. Even on a global scale, numbers of terrorist casualties varied 
merely between 12 and 704 per year from 1968 to 1997.2 In more recent years, the number of 
global deaths caused by terrorist attacks averages to less than two thousand annually. In 
addition, most terrorist attacks are very limited in their scope. Typically only people in the 
immediate neighborhood of an attack will be affected. However, since September 11, 2001 
terrorist attacks have been attributed a growing likelihood. Moreover, recent data shows an 
increase in the lethality of individual terrorist incidents.  
In the wake of September 11 there has also been a re-evaluation of the threat of 
international proliferation. The potential of weapons of mass destruction, that is chemical, 
biological, and nuclear weapons, reaching the hands of terrorist groups like al Qaeda has 
received particular attention. The sarin gas attacks by the Japanese Aum sect in Tokyo in 1995 
and the anthrax letters mailed to Congress in 2001 have illustrated the relative ease with which 
chemical agents can be manufactured by amateurs. Equally likely is the development of nuclear 
weapons by countries such as North Korea or Iran. The scope and intensity of the danger posed 
by the use of weapons of mass destruction is very high. They can not only destroy cities, but 
also entire regions and countries. However, the likelihood of their deployment is unclear. 
Biological and chemical weapons are notoriously difficult to control, and nuclear weapons 
invite massive retaliation. Weapons of  
 [6] mass destruction have rarely been used even by the most determined actors.3 Traditionally, 
nuclear weapons have primarily been obtained for defensive purposes. Indeed, the nuclear 
stalemate between the United States and the Soviet Union has been credited by some with the 
preservation of the “long peace” that characterized the Cold War in Europe.4 However, the 
actors who would employ weapons of mass destruction and the nature of these weapons 
appear to be changing. Suicide terrorists are presumably less concerned about their ability to 
control biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons and more willing to take the risks involved in 
using them. Moreover, weapons of mass destruction are becoming more easily obtainable and 
deployable. So-called “dirty bombs” of nuclear material do not require sophisticated knowledge 
or material and the United States is studying the development of a new class of low-yield 
nuclear weapons for use in limited warfare rather than as a deterrent.5  
Statistically the most dangerous form of proliferation is the spread of small arms and 
light weapons. There are currently 600 million small arms and light weapons in circulation 
affecting every part of the world. Used in wars as well as homicide, small arms kill over half a 
million people per year. Moreover, during the 1990s, small arms emerged as the weapon of 
choice in 47 out of 49 major conflicts, most of them civil wars.6 The link between small arms 
proliferation and civil conflict is particularly lethal since the number of intrastate wars has 
been increasing progressively since 1945.7 
In the 1970s there were annually between 15 and 20 major civil conflicts per year, in the 1980s 
this had increased to between 20 and 30, and since the 1990s it lies between 25 and 35. 
Conversely the number of interstate conflicts has been rarely above five per year during the 
same period.8 Civil war scores high in terms of scope and intensity as well. Civil war not only 
affects large regions from Africa to South America and South-East Asia, it also ranks high in 
terms of threats to both the survival and the welfare of the peoples involved with both 
immediate and long-term consequences to life and prosperity. 
Nevertheless, the credit of being the deadliest threat in contemporary security does not 
go to any form of human conflict, but to HIV/AIDS. The threat from this disease is not 
geographically limited, it leads to death within on average ten years, and the probability of 
adult infection ranges between 0.1 percent in Australia, 0.5-0.7 percent in North America, and 
7.5-8.5 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa. In 2003, three million people died of HIV/AIDS.9 
Furthermore, because of the long gestation period of the illness, HIV/AIDS has serious effects 
on the well-being of the infected and their relatives. 
The preceding sections have indicated that none of these contemporary security threats 
are “new”. Concerning terrorism, proliferation, and civil war, data has been collected since the 
1940s or 1960s. Nevertheless, it can be argued that all of them have achieved a new quality. 
The following section examines what distinguishes the new security threats of today from 
those which dominated the Cold War era. 
 
Nature of the “New” Threats 
If a security threat is generally defined by its probability, scope, intensity, and object, the 
central security concerns of today are characterized by a number of changes in some of these 
dimensions that differentiate  
 [7] them from the threat of interstate war that defined the theory and practice of international 
security during the Cold War period. In particular, the new security threats appear to have a 
higher probability, a more variable scope and intensity, and a new object. Moreover, all of them 
are transnational security threats challenging the authority and reach of individual states. 
Examining each of these aspects in turn, it can be suggested that although these threats are not 
entirely “new”, they have a number of characteristics that set them apart from traditional 
security concerns of the last century and appear to be especially dangerous today. 
One of the main features common among the security threats discussed in the preceding 
section is their higher probability. Although a nuclear war was considered the primary security 
threat of the Cold War period, its historical frequency was rather low. In the 20th century, there 
was only in once instance, namely during World War II, when nuclear weapons were employed 
in a military conflict. What ensured the priority of nuclear war among security policy makers 
was not its likelihood based on previous experience, but rather its potentially devastating 
effects on the survival and welfare of peoples around the globe. 
New threats, such as terrorism, transnational crime, civil conflicts, and HIV/AIDS are 
much more pervasive and probable. In comparison with interstate war, civil conflicts have not 
only been on average about five times more frequent, also has the number of internal conflicts 
been steadily increasing since the end of World War II, while the occurrence of intrastate war 
has been relatively stable. Similarly, the number of terrorist casualties appears to have been on 
the rise since the 1960s reaching its peak with 4,548 in 2001.10 Although a latecomer, 
HIV/AIDS by far exceeds these numbers with a steady increase from two million deaths 
globally in 1999 to three million in 2003.11 The statistical chance of any individual being 
directly affected by one or several of these threats during their lives today is considerably 
higher than the threat of nuclear war has been during the Cold War period. 
In addition, the new security threats are more diverse in terms of their scope and 
intensity and thus appear to be more difficult to assess. Many of the effects of civil war, 
transnational crime, terrorism, and HIV/AIDS are not immediately apparent, but can only be 
measured in the long term. Moreover, their consequences on the lives of peoples are frequently 
indirect. These consequences include the displacement of large sections of a population, the 
damaging of the economy, the shortening of life expectancies and the withholding of foreign 
investment. 
The third and most critical common feature of contemporary security threats is the fact 
that they do not target states, but societies and individuals. The new threats, such as civil war, 
terrorism, and transnational crime, the proliferation of small arms and HIV/AIDS, are 
transnational. Using the same technologies and means of transport that have benefited the 
globalization of trade and finance these transnational security threats illustrate that global 
integration can not only lead to new opportunities, but also new dangers. Specifically their 
ability to cross national boundaries with little hindrance undermines the security provisions 
established by a system based on sovereign nation-states. 
Transnational threats are particularly unsettling because they do not fit into the 
analytical frameworks that had been developed during the Cold War.  
 [8] Governments and international organizations have had to realize that their established 
security arrangements, such as large standing armed forces and the protection of national 
borders, are unsuited for the fight against transnational threats. However, not only do 
governments have to adapt their strategies to address these security threats, national borders 
and sovereignty which provided the basis for national and international security in the past are 
now frequently proving an obstacle. Transnational threats are thus requiring a reconsideration 
of security and how it can be achieved. The following section suggests that non-state actors 
play a crucial role in this transformation. 
 
 
New Actors 
 
Non-state actors have not only contributed to the emergence of new security threats such as 
terrorism and transnational crime, they are also playing a growing role in the provision of 
security. This section examines the nature and capabilities of non-state actors which enables 
them to help address contemporary security threats either in collaboration with governments 
or independently. 
 
Types of Non-State Actors 
Non-state actors formally can be grouped into two categories--private actors and 
intergovernmental organizations. The former includes a variety of forms such as private 
companies, charities, local pressure groups, as well as national and international 
nongovernmental organizations. The latter refers to multilateral institutions formed by 
sovereign nation-states. This book focuses in particular on three types of actors that have 
become key actors in contemporary security: non-governmental organizations, private military 
companies, and international institutions. 
Non-governmental organizations are one of the largest groups of non-state actors 
engaged in security. They are typically defined as voluntary, non-profit organizations that 
operate at the national, regional, and global levels. NGOs include multilateral associations, such 
as the International Red Cross, international organizations, such as Médecins sans Frontières, 
and a multitude of regional or national NGOs, such as the American Refugee Committee. As the 
following chapters will illustrate, NGOs contribute directly and indirectly to security by offering 
services such as humanitarian aid and conflict reconciliation or by lobbying governments and 
international organizations in areas such as arms control and HIV/AIDS research. 
Private military companies are more limited in their number and services, but have 
proliferated exponentially since the end of the Cold War. Commonly, the literature on private 
military companies distinguishes three types of firms based on the services that they offer.12 
The term “mercenary firms” has been employed to denote private military companies that 
provide private soldiers and directly engage in national or international conflicts such as 
Sandline International, which was involved in the civil wars in Angola or Sierra Leone. “Private 
military firms” has been used to refer to companies that offer military training and strategic 
advice such as the Virginia-based Military Professional Resources Inc. (MPRI), and “private 
security firms” has been used to describe firms which provide military support, including 
logistics, base maintenance, and transportation such as Halliburton. Typically, however, 
companies offer a range of services across these 
 [9] categories and the terms private security and private military companies are therefore used 
interchangeably in this book. 
Finally, the number and role of international regimes and organizations have expanded 
in global security since the Cold War. Both can be formally distinguished in that the term 
“international regimes” is most often used to refer to multinational institutions that take the 
form of intergovernmental agreements or treaties. Examples include non-proliferation regimes 
such as the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers 
Group, and the Wassenaar Agreement. International regimes typically do not have an 
institutional organization, but are directly implemented by the member states. Conversely, 
international organizations like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the United Nations, and 
the European Union have independent organizational and administrative capabilities. 
 
Characteristics of the “New” Actors 
As with the security threats identified above, neither non-governmental organizations nor 
private military companies or international organizations are in fact “new” actors. 
Nevertheless, it can be argued that all three types of actors have not only proliferated 
disproportionally over the past two decades, they have also significantly expanded their 
contribution to the making and implementation of security policies. NGOs, for instance, have 
become key actors in the provision of human security in the post-Cold War interventions in the 
former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Iraq. Private military companies increasingly offer military 
support services for national armed forces well as in international peacekeeping since the mid-
1990s. International organizations, such as NATO and the European Union, have extended their 
functional and geographical scope since the fall of the Iron Curtain to include new members in 
Central and Eastern Europe and address a new range of security threats. 
What makes NGOs, private military companies, and international regimes and 
organizations “new” actors in contemporary security is that they are challenging the 
“monopoly” of the nation-state in the legitimate provision of security that had developed over 
the past centuries and appears to have reached its prime during the Cold War. Today it is 
widely accepted that NGOs and international organizations play important roles in global 
security. Moreover, some of these actors lay claim to a higher legitimacy than states because 
they are not operating in the interest of a single nation. Most crucially, NGOs, private security 
companies, and international organizations appear to be more suited to address contemporary 
security threats because they can operate across state boundaries by building on national 
chapters and multilateral cooperation. Similarly, many governments have been forced to 
recognize that a system based on national sovereignty can be rather ineffective when it comes 
to fight transnational proliferation, crime, terrorism, or HIV/AIDS. Since the new security 
threats predominantly target individuals and not states, governments find that sub-state actors 
such as NGOs and private military companies can help provide security at this level. Moreover, 
because threats such as terrorism and the proliferation of small arms are operating 
transnationally, many nation-states accept that multilateral cooperation through international 
regimes or organizations has become more important. 
 [10] The changing nature of security threats and actors is not only transforming the making 
and implementation of security policies, it also has serious implications for the theoretical 
analysis of security. In particular, these two interlinked developments suggest that the study of 
security needs to be broadened beyond the state as the primary unit of analysis--both in terms 
of its object and subject. The following section examines the widening and deepening of the 
concept of security and the emergence of security governance as a framework for the analysis 
of contemporary international relations. 
  
 
Implications for International Relations Theory 
 
Having its origins as a separate field of study in the last century, theorizing in international 
relations and security studies has crucially been influenced by the experience of the two world 
wars and the superpower confrontation that followed it. As a consequence, many theoretical 
approaches to security studies have tended to focus on the threat of nuclear war and the role of 
states and their alliances in maintaining international security. Since the end of the Cold War, 
interstate war appears to have been replaced by a multitude of new transnational security 
threats. Moreover, as the preceding sections have suggested, the making and implementation of 
security policies is becoming increasingly fragmented among a multiplicity of actors, including 
states, international organizations, NGOs, and private military companies. International 
relations theory has reflected these transformations through three developments in particular: 
the broadening of the notion of security, the emergence of the concept of security governance, 
and the analysis of transnational networks. This section examines each of these new theoretical 
developments in turn. 
 
Redefinition of Security 
Already in the 1980s some authors pointed out the need to reexamine the meaning of 
security.13 However, in particular since the end of the Cold War the concept of security has 
become increasingly contested in international relations theory.14 At the heart of this debate 
have been attempts to deepen and widen the concept of security from the level of the state to 
societies and individuals, and from military to non-military issues. 
 This challenge to the state-centric notion of security that had dominated the discipline 
builds upon the argument that the end of the superpower confrontation has significantly 
reduced the likelihood of interstate war, whereas the threat from civil war, transnational crime, 
terrorism, and infectious diseases appears to have increased. As has been outlined in the 
preceding sections, annually many more casualties are incurred by subnational and 
transnational threats than from major power conflicts. In 1999, for instance, about 32 000 
individuals were killed in interstate wars. However, more than 900 people were killed through 
terrorist attacks, up to 39 000 were killed in civil conflicts, and no less than 2.8 million were 
killed by AIDS.15 The changing balance becomes even more striking in the data provided by the 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) which records on average thirty 
major conflicts per year between 1990 and 2000, yet SIPRI observed only eight interstate wars 
during the entire ten-year period.16 
 [11] Academics remain divided over the utility of a more inclusive notion of security.17 Stephen 
Walt, for instance, has argued that that broadening of the concept of security will “destroy its 
intellectual coherence and make it more difficult to devise solutions to any of these important 
problems”18. And Ole Wæver has warned that the “securitization” of an issue, i.e. it being 
identified as a national or international security issue, “tends to lead to specific ways of 
addressing it: threat, defense, and often state-centred solutions”19. Nevertheless, a broader 
understanding of security has by now come to be widely accepted not only in international 
relations theory, but also among policy makers. The field of international relations today 
includes an ever-increasing number of studies on environmental security, human security, and 
HIV/AIDS as a security issue.20 These studies argue that examining new security threats need 
not detract from the analysis of interstate war, but rather complements it. In fact, 
understanding the security effects of environmental degradation, underdevelopment, and 
diseases can help explain and resolve intrastate and interstate conflicts.  
Moreover, by adopting a broad definition of security international relations theory 
responds to important changes in the security policy-making process. Politicians, the military, 
and the general public are increasingly recognizing that crime, terrorism, environmental 
degradation, and infectious diseases are endangering not only individual, but also national 
security. This transformation is widely reflected in the national security estimates in the United 
States and other countries. Moreover, international organizations, such as NATO and the 
Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe for instance, have expanded the scope of 
their security functions to include the fight against terrorism, international peacekeeping, 
refugee resettlement, and the promotion of civil society among others. Even the European 
Union which was conceived of as an economic organization is defining a growing array of its 
concerns in terms of security, including immigration and development aid.21 
 
From Government to Security Governance 
At the same time as governments and international organizations have extended their security 
concerns, however, limited resources, lack of expertise in non-traditional areas of security, and 
divergent interests among the United States and European governments have facilitated the 
fragmentation of security policy making. As the following chapters will illustrate, in addition to 
national governments and international organizations, a variety of private actors ranging from 
charities to private security companies have emerged in local, regional, and global security 
dealing with issues such as humanitarian aid, human rights monitoring, refugees, and military 
protection.22 
While in the area of security the relations between diverse groups of actors have 
traditionally been conceived in terms of alliances, the fragmented but overlapping networks 
which structure the collaboration among the growing range of state and non-state security 
actors are more adequately described by the concept of governance. Contrary to “government” 
which refers to a system of centralized political control within the state, “governance” denotes 
a fragmented mode of policy making that includes state and non-state actors at the subnational, 
national, and international levels.23 Gordenker and Weiss thus define global governance as  
 [12] “efforts to bring more orderly and reliable responses to social and political issues that go 
beyond capacities of states to address individually. Like the NGO universe, global governance 
implies an absence of central authority, and the need for collaboration or cooperation among 
governments and others who seek to encourage common practices and goals in addressing 
global issues.”24 
 The characteristics of governance arrangements vary widely. Most are concentrated 
around sets of states that share specific geographic, economic, and cultural similarities. 
However, even within these sets, governance is fragmented among governmental and non-
governmental actors at the national and international levels. While states continue to play a 
central role in global governance, international organizations, NGOs, and multinational 
corporations increasingly participate in the formulation, implementation, and monitoring of 
international policies, rules and regulations.25 Moreover, in the absence of a central authority in 
the international system and shifting balances of power, the relationships between 
governmental and non-governmental actors at the national and international level are 
frequently complex and horizontal.26 
Several factors that involve the emergence of new threats and new actors have been 
identified as causes for a shift from government to governance in security. The first factor has 
been budgetary pressures that have encouraged the outsourcing and privatization of state 
security functions in a bid for improved efficiency.27 The second factor is a growing awareness 
of global problems and new security threats, such as transnational crime, terrorism, and 
migration, which can only be resolved through international cooperation.28 The third factor is 
globalization, specifically increased transnational contact, which appears to be creating or 
exacerbating many of these problems.29 
Specifically, the shift from government to governance in security can be observed in the 
fragmentation of political authority among state and non-state actors in seven key dimensions: 
geography, function, distribution of resources, interests, norms, decision-making, and policy 
implementation.30 With the help of these seven dimensions a framework for the analysis of 
policy-making arrangements can be established that distinguishes between “government” and 
“governance” as ideal types. This theoretical framework helps to conceptualize the emergence 
of security governance since end of the Cold War. 
The first dimension suggests that government and governance can be distinguished in 
terms of the geographical scope of policy-making arrangements. Government can thus be 
defined as centralized modes of governing based on the state as the key unit, whereas 
governance is characterized by the fragmentation of political authority among regional, global, 
and transnational private entities. In security, geographical fragmentation has particularly 
involved the delegation of security functions from the state to the regional level, such as NATO 
and the EU, to the global level, such as the United Nations, and to private actors, such as NGOs 
and private security companies.31 
 The second dimension proposes that policy-making arrangements can very between 
functional centralization and differentiation. A shift to security governance is thus indicated by 
the issue-specific division of labor in recent international peacekeeping missions such as in the 
former Yugoslavia where the United 
 [13] Nations or NATO provided military security, while NGOs dealt with humanitarian aid, and 
private security companies offered logistical support.32 
The third dimension implies that the distribution of resources can also be understood in 
terms of centralization and fragmentation. In centralized arrangements all or most resources 
that are required for the making and implementation of policies are ideal-typically held or 
channeled by the government. Conversely, in fragmented governance arrangements resources 
are dispersed among a range of public and private actors who have to coordinate their efforts 
in order to resolve common problems. In global security, it can be argued, this dispersion of 
capabilities has been fostered by the broadening of the notion of security to include new issues 
such as refugees and the environment where non-state actors have accumulated considerable 
experience as well as by the increasing cost of a more comprehensive security policy. 
 The fourth dimension suggests in addition a distinction between centralized and 
differentiated interests. It contends that the underlying premise of central government is that 
individual preferences can and should be subordinated to the common interests, whereas the 
notion of governance implies an acceptance of the heterogeneous and sometimes conflicting 
nature of interests and seeks to ensure that each actor can pursue them as uninhibited as 
possible. The emergence of security governance can thus be identified in the weakening of the 
transatlantic alliance and a shift towards “coalitions of the willing” after the end of the Cold 
War. Both developments are a response to the more localized and long-term consequences of 
the new security threats that, in spite of their transnational repercussions, allow governments 
to resist direct involvement unless they believe their immediate security interests are 
concerned. In addition, the increasing number of non-state actors introduces new interests into 
the security policy-making process such as the religious or ethical imperatives of NGOs. 
 In addition, the fifth dimension identifies diverging norms underlying government and 
governance, either promoting a strong state or prioritizing the self-determination of public and 
private actors. Three norms have traditionally supported the central authority of the state vis-
à-vis national and international actors: sovereignty, command and control, and the ideal of 
redistribution. The opposing principle of differentiation is represented in the increasing 
limitation of national sovereignty, self-government, and marketization. In security the 
weakening of the norm of national sovereignty could be particularly observed in the 
intervention in Kosovo to counter Serb “ethnic cleansing” as well as more recently in the war 
against Iraq. In both interventions, self-government and the commercialization of security have 
been growing features as illustrated by the involvement of NGOs in both countries and an 
estimated 15,000 private military personnel in Iraq.33 
 Finally, the difference between government and governance also applies to policy 
decision-making and implementation. Decision-making processes that are centralized within 
governments are typically hierarchical, democratic, and consensual. Governance, on the 
contrary, is defined by horizontal relations among state and non-state actors, negotiation, and 
structural inequality. Similarly, policy implementation in government is centralized, 
authoritative, and, if necessary, 
 [14] coercive, while governance involves decentralized implementation, self-enforced policies, 
and voluntary compliance. In global security, the rise of governance is thus illustrated by the 
proliferation of non-state actors engaged in major international interventions and the 
emergence of civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) as a concept and policy making arrangement.34 
 
Governance and Networks 
Characteristic of the shift from government to governance is the development of new 
networked forms of coordination among state and non-state actors. Networks are defined as 
sets of actors who share an interest in a specific issue area and are linked to each other through 
stable formal or informal relations.35 They can include domestic, transnational, and 
international linkages.36 Moreover, networks allow for a mixture of relations ranging from 
hierarchical to horizontal, and from government to market.37 The basis of network relations is 
typically the exchange of information, money, political support, or commitments for 
cooperative behavior among the involved actors. 
 Networks are particularly suited for political coordination in global and security 
governance for several reasons. First, due to the inclusion and frequently dominance of 
informal relations, networks are flexible and can adapt comparatively quickly and easily to new 
actors or demands. While formal institutional linkages require considerable time and resources 
in order to be established in national law or international regimes, informal relations can be set 
up instantaneously among actors who have an interest in an exchange or collaboration on a 
particular issue. New actors can enter into these relations on the basis of their capabilities and 
open channels of communication. New issues or problems can be responded to by forming new 
networks among affected actors or by transforming existing networks in order to enlarge their 
scope or capabilities.  
In security, new networks have thus emerged and old networks have been adapted in 
response to the end of the Cold War. A prime example of changing networks is the transatlantic 
security community. In particular, NATO has transformed from a collective defense to a 
collective security organization, expanded its functions from military defense to peacekeeping 
and peacemaking, and incorporated new members in Central and Eastern Europe first through 
informal relations and later through formal enlargement. Moreover, the Atlantic Alliance has 
established informal civil-military relations with NGOs and other private actors during its 
interventions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo.38 During each of these interventions new 
operation-specific networks have developed among state and non-state actors engaged in the 
region in order to coordinate their interests and functions such as the provision of military 
security, mine clearance, humanitarian aid, and reconstruction.  
  Second, by moving beyond traditional institutional relations among states or among 
state and non-state actors, networks can stretch across national boundaries and sovereignties. 
Networks thus can address transnational security threats such as terrorism, transnational 
crime, HIV/AIDS, and small arms proliferation more effectively. Often these networks involve 
formal cooperation in transnational organizations like Interpol or international regimes such 
as the Nuclear Suppliers Group. However, equally often they build on transnational private 
 [15] linkages most notably within charitable federations such as the International Red Cross 
and Red Crescent Societies, Médecins sans Frontières, CARE, Amnesty International, or Human 
Rights Watch, which have national chapters in different countries, or collective organizations 
such as InterAction. 
Third, through decentralization and horizontal relationships networks promote 
subsidiarity, i.e. the making and implementation of policies by those who are directly involved 
or affected. Networks thereby encourage the development of differentiated solutions for a 
complex world rather than the imposition of centrally directed, uniform policies. Moreover, 
networks foster the use of local knowledge and resources, which benefits the long-term 
advancement of affected communities. Finally, drawing on local groups, personnel, and assets 
is frequently more cost-efficient than using centralized capabilities. In security governance, 
states and international organizations such as the United Nations, thus increasingly attempt to 
develop “civil society” in the form of local or regional groups that can help with security issues 
and reconstruction after conflicts. In addition, NGOs and private military companies employ to 
a large degree local personnel wherever they are operating.  
However, networks do not only develop among state and non-state actors concerned 
with providing security. Transnational crime, terrorism, and the proliferation of small arms 
increasingly also use networks as operating system. These “dark networks”39 benefit from the 
same characteristics that help states and non-state actors to coordinate their efforts to combat 
these threats: flexibility, transnational relations, local knowledge, and efficiency. Similar 
pressures thus facilitate similar structures among new threats and new actors in security 
governance. 
 
 
Content of the Book 
 
To examine the complex relationship between new threats and new actors in contemporary 
security this book is divided into four parts: civil war, transnational crime and terrorism, 
HIV/AIDS, and the proliferation of small arms. The first part specifically examines the 
contribution of non-state actors to international peacekeeping. In chapter two, “The New 
Conflict Managers: Peacebuilding NGOs”, Loramy Gerstbauer provides a compelling analysis of 
the emerging role of NGOs in conflict and post-conflict environments. She suggests that many 
relief and development organizations have come to realize the impact of their presence and 
their provision of aid in conflicts. Consequently, they have decided to add peacebuilding to 
their mandates. However, Gerstbauer points out, NGO conflict management activities are not 
uncontroversial. Just as development NGOs are interdependent with the government agencies 
that fund them, the new NGO mandate is heavily influenced by state interests in post conflict 
settings. This raises a number of dilemmas for NGOs ranging from the challenge of maintaining 
neutrality when working alongside or in cooperation with armed forces to balancing the 
influence and interests of donors and recipients.  
In chapter three, “Humanitarians and Mercenaries: Partners in Security Governance?”, 
Christopher Spearin picks up on this theme by analyzing the emerging partnership between 
peacebuilding NGOs and private security companies. 
 [16] Particularly he raises the question whether the employment of private security by NGOs 
will lead to a new humanitarian order through which all those in need of assistance will receive 
aid promptly and effectively. Spearin argues that, although there are good reasons for this 
partnership, there are also a number of problems such as the image of the “mercenary” and the 
cost of private security. In the end a trade-off will have to be made. 
The second part of the book turns to terrorism and transnational crime as key security 
threats for the new millennium and the contribution that private actors can make to address 
these threats. In chapter four, “Drug Trafficking, Terrorist Networks, and Ill-Fated Government 
Strategies”, Michael Kenney offers a unique analysis of the similarities between terrorist 
networks and the transnational drug trade. As a consequence, Kenney explains, the existing 
“head hunting” approach to the war on terrorism threatens to repeat critical mistakes in the 
anti-drug initiatives of the 1990s. Specifically, Kenney argues that by focusing its military, law 
enforcement, and intelligence capabilities on a handful of organizations and individuals, the 
U.S. government runs the risk of weeding out the most notorious enterprises and providing 
opportunities for lesser known, more technologically sophisticated operations to materialize. 
Chapter five  “Targeting Money Laundering: Global Approach or Diffusion of Authority” 
by Eleni Tsingou explains why combating money laundering is central to contemporary 
security, notably as a means of undermining terrorist and transnational criminal activities. Yet, 
Tsingou argues, in particular private financial institutions perceive a tension between the cost 
of dealing with money laundering and the benefits of containing financial crime. Fostering 
private corporate responsibility in the form of self-regulation and the implementation of public 
policies thus becomes a central concern in security. 
The third part of the book analyses HIV/AIDS as a global security threat and the role of 
non-governmental actors in addressing it. In chapter six, “HIV/AIDS: The International Security 
Dimensions”, Stefan Elbe sets out convincingly why the global AIDS pandemic is no longer 
solely a health issue, but also contains human, national, and international security dimensions. 
Elbe contends that only by recognizing these security dimensions we can arrive at a more 
comprehensive understanding of the nature and extent of the contemporary AIDS pandemic 
and to develop suitable responses. 
This analysis is complemented by chapter seven, “NGOs as Security Actors in the Fight 
against HIV/AIDS?”, by Carrie Sheehan which examines how HIV/AIDS is addressed. Sheehan 
observes that there is currently a proliferation of NGOs working in developing countries on the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic. However, Sheehan illustrates that while many states, think tanks, and 
international organizations today perceive HIV/AIDS as an national and international security 
issue, NGOs do not. The result is a disconnection between the actors addressing the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic at the policy level and the, frequently non-state, actors implementing HIV/AIDS 
programs. 
The final part of the book discusses the role of non-state actors in the proliferation of 
small arms and light weapons as well as their contribution to the establishment of effective 
non-proliferation regimes. Chapter eight, “The Proliferation of 
 [17] Small Arms and Light Weapons”, by Mike Bourne turns to small arms and light weapons 
(SALW) proliferation as a security threat and explains how non-state actors, such as brokers, 
transporters, transnational criminal organizations, as well as criminalized state officials 
contribute to the global spread of SALW. Bourne specifically highlights the collaboration 
between non-state and state actors in the spread of SALW and their diversion from the legal 
sphere into illicit circulation. 
In chapter nine, “NGOs and the Shaping of the European Union Conventional Arms 
Regime”, Holger Anders offers an insightful examination of how NGOs influenced the creation 
of the European Union regime on conventional arms. Anders argues that transnational 
networks of NGOs, researchers, and campaigners were able to shape public policies on small 
arms by consistently mobilizing and generating political and public support for their policy 
preferences, and by closely interacting with government officials across Europe. Thus, Anders 
demonstrates how non-state actors could facilitate and contribute to governmental policy 
coalitions, and insist on the inclusion of certain dynamic elements in the European regime. 
The conclusion of this book seeks to summarize the findings presented in the preceding 
chapters and discusses the advantages and problems that have been identified with regard to 
the growing role of non-state actors in security and the collaboration between state and non-
state agents. It particular the conclusion raises the question whether the shift from government 
to governance is a suitable solution to the emergence of transnational security threats that 
cannot be addressed within the traditional system of nation states. Moreover, the conclusion 
discusses whether the growing influence of private actors a sign of the emergence of a global 
civil society or whether private actors are merely tools for state intervention. 
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